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This short paper analyses a simple extension to the model of
Galor and Zeira (1993). I show that the result of club convergence
holds under a much more continuous and much more realistic
assumption of the education function. In order to achieve this
result, the hypothesis of a fixed cost in education assumed in the
original model has been replaced by the assumption that
individuals can choose exactly how much to invest. It is also
assumed that this investment positively affects the productivity of
the individual which, in turn, influences his salary. [JEL
Classification: D31, D63, I20, O47]
1. - Introduction
In the last twenty years, the convergence of national incomes
per capita has been the subject of intense debate in economic
literature. The controversy
1 principally focuses on the validity of
the following two, competing hypotheses
2:
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1 See GALOR O. (1996) for more details about the debate. 
2 There is also a third hypothesis “The absolute convergence” - which suggests
that  per capita incomes of countries converge one to another in the long run1) “The conditional convergence hypothesis” — which
suggests that per capita incomes of countries identical in their
structural characteristics (for example preferences, technologies,
rates of population growth, etc.) converge towards one another in
the long-run independently of their initial conditions. 
2) “The club convergence hypothesis” (polarisation, persistent
poverty, and clustering) — which suggests that per capita incomes
of countries identical in their structural characteristics converge
towards one another, providing their initial conditions are also
similar. 
In other words, the conditional convergence hypothesis is
linked to the idea that each economy is characterized by a unique,
globally stable, steady state equilibrium, whereas the club con-
vergence hypothesis suggests the existence of multiple, locally sta-
ble, equilibriums, which means that countries with similar struc-
tural characteristics converge towards the same equilibrium pro-
vided that their initial conditions are similar as well.
The hypothesis of conditional convergence belongs to the
oldest conception of growth (that of neoclassical models) which
derives from the application of the basic Solow model to the
comparison of countries. These models, characterized by
diminishing marginal productivity of capital and by constant
returns to scale, suggest that among countries with similar
technologies, preferences, etc., the lower the levels of output per
capita, the higher the growth rates
3 are.
Although the neoclassical paradigm represents one of the
pillars of the growth theory, these models can not explain
(endogenously) the condition of persistent poverty which affects
most developing countries. Indeed, if the conditional convergence
hypothesis was able to exhaustively represent the phenomenon of
growth, the empirical data should show higher growth rates in
developing countries compared to developed countries. Not only
has this not happened, but also the growth of many poor countries
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regardless their structural characteristics. But this hypothesis has been rejected by
the economists in light of the empirical results of BARRO R.J. (1991) and QUAH D.
(1996). 
3 See MANKIW N.G.  et AL. (1992) for supporting evidence for the conditional
convergence hypothesis.has been negative. Thus, the difference between national incomes
seems to increase rather than decrease
4. 
An example used in the literature, first by Lucas (1993) and
then by Benabou (1996), is the comparison of the miraculous
growth of South Korea and the stagnation experienced by the
Philippines. Although these two countries were similar with
respect to all major economic aggregates in early 1960s, over the
next quarter century South Korea had an average growth of 6%
while the Philippines stagnated at about 2%. Only lately it has
been noticed that initial conditions were in fact quite different:
the income distribution in the Philippines was much more
unequal.
In order to account for these divergences in income per capi-
ta highlighted by the empirical studies, following Romer’s famous
1986 article an array of so-called endogenous growth models came
into being. These models promote a new concept of growth, based
on increasing returns to scale
5. According to these models, the
power of capital — human capital, physical capital and capital of
knowledge — is high where the level of capital is already plenti-
ful, and low where the capital is scarce. Behind this conviction,
there is the idea that knowledge can be broadened through in-
vestments and thus create several positive externalities for society.
This suggests that the lower the level of capital in a country, the
lower the growth rate expected. This interpretation of the growth
phenomena gives a reasonable explanation of how many countries
can become a victim of poverty traps from which it is very diffi-
cult to escape. Alas, the empirical evidence based on time series
does not seem to support the endogenous growth model’s predic-
tions, suggesting that in the real world there are decreasing re-
turn to scale rather than increasing return to scale
6.
Thus, the issue for economists becomes to understand how it
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4 See EASTERLY W. (2001) for a complete report of all the empiric studies which
support this result. 
5 See ROMER P.M. (1990); GROSSMAN G. - HELPMAN E. (1991) and AGHION P. -
HOWIT P.  (1992) for the endogenous growth models based on investment in R&D,
ARROW K.J. (1962) for the Learning by Doing type of models, and REBELO S.T.
(1991) for the AK models. 
6 See JONES C.I. (1995); (1999).is possible to generate club convergence in the neoclassical para-
digm of growth. In other words, researchers must find a way to
make the standard growth models allow for the heterogeneous be-
haviour of agents and countries, so that they can do different
things not only in the short run but in the long run as well. The
first attempt in this new research stream has been made by
Aziaridis and Drazen (1990), who use non-convexities to add het-
erogeneous behaviour in the saving function of the agents in the
neoclassical growth models. Nowadays we know that heterogene-
ity can be added in many different ways, but it was not so evi-
dent at that time
7. Galor (1996) indeed underlines how the hy-
pothesis of multiple long-run equilibria can, in fact, be perfectly
consistent with the neoclassical paradigm if we allow for hetero-
geneous agents. Specifically, if the neoclassical growth models are
augmented so as to capture additional significant elements such
as human capital, income distribution and fertility, within the hy-
pothesis of capital market imperfections and non-convexities of
technology, they will generate club convergence. Several articles
— amongst which; Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton
(1996), Benabou (1996), Durlauf (1996) and Quah (1996) —
demonstrate that in the presence of capital market imperfections
and of a fixed cost for the production of human capital (or of a
final article of manufactured goods), the initial distribution of
wealth significantly affects the economic activity both in the short
and long run
8.
This short paper analyses a simple extension to the model of
Galor and Zeira (1993). I show that the result of club convergence
still hold under the assumption of a much more continuous
education function. In order to achieve this result, the hypothesis
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7 The same result can be achieved for example through asymmetric information
(PIKETTY T., 1997), the rule of redistribution policies, etc. For a detailed summary
see BENABOU R.J. (1996). For an example which applies to the model of Galor and
Zeira see MOAV O. (2002) who replaces non-convex technology with a convex
bequest function, or by introducing fertility choice in a framework of a trade-off
between the quantity of child and the quality of their life. (MOAV O., 2005). 
8 Actually more recent studies have shown that neoclassical growth model can
generate club convergence even if the credit markets are perfect. See MOOKHERJEE
D. - RAY D. (2003) and TETSUYA N. (2006).of a fixed cost in education assumed in the original model has
been replaced by the assumption that individuals can choose
exactly how much to invest. It is also assumed that this investment
positively affects the productivity of the individual which, in turn,
influences his salary.
Intuitively these new assumptions are much more realistic
because, generally, there are many different opportunities of
investment in education. For example the choice between a public
or a private university, or the choice to follow a more or less
specialized course, or even the choice between studying abroad or
not, etc. Then, it is obvious that generally, someone with a better
quality of education will end up in a higher paid job. This is due
to the fact that — at least from the employer’s eyes — someone
with a higher level of education is more productive
9. 
2. - The Model
Consider a small open economy with a single good. The good
can be either consumed or invested. The good can be produced
by two technologies, one which uses skilled labour and capital and
the other using unskilled labour only. Production in the skilled




t, Kt and Ht, are respectively the level of output, physical
capital, and generic human capital in time t. It is worthy of note
that  Ht = a –
tL
s
t, that is the level of generic human capital is given
by the product of the sector’s average productivity a –
t with the
number of skilled workers L
s
t. F is a concave production function
with decreasing return to scale.
Production in the unskilled sector is described by: 
YF K H t
s
tt = (,)
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9 What really matters for the employer is the productivity of the employee.
However before the latter has been hired his productivity is not directly
observable by the former. The level of education is therefore used as a signal of
productivity.(2)
where  Y
n ,  and  L
n
t are output and unskilled labour input
respectively, and wn > 0 is the marginal productivity in this sector.
Individuals in this economy live for two periods. They can
either work as unskilled for both periods or invest in education
in the first period and work in the skilled sector in the second
period. The amount invested in human capital in terms of
monetary cost is given by h, and unlike the original model of Galor
and Zeira, is not fixed but endogenously produced by the model.
I assume that the investment in education positively affects




where 0 < β < 1, which implies a productivity function with
decreasing return to scale with respect to the investment in
education.
Each individual has one parent and one child, which means
that the population is constant and equal to L in every generation.
Individuals care about future generations and leave them bequests.
In line with the original model, I assume that individuals consume
in their second period life only
11. Formally, we can express the
individuals’ preferences as following:
(4)
where c is consumption in the second period and b is the bequest
left to the child. Thus, each individual is born with the same
preferences and abilities, they only differ in their initial wealth,
that is how much they have inherited from their parents.
Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile so that individuals
uc b =+ − αα log ( )log 1
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10 Indeed: ai = Hi = (1+h
β
i) where Hi is the part of human capital owned by
individual i.
11 It is a very strong assumption but it is sometimes used in Overlapping
generations models.and firms have free access to the international capital markets.
The world interest rate is equal to r > 0 and is constant over time.
Individuals can lend any amount at this rate. However, if they
want to borrow, they must pay a higher interest rate: i > r. This
difference between the lending and the borrowing rate comes from
the assumption that individuals can evade debt payments by
escaping to other places. Therefore, there are some monitoring
costs for the bank in order to guarantee the reimbursement of the
debt. These costs are recovered by charging the borrowers a higher
interest rate. These costs create what the authors call “credit
market imperfections”
12.
Unlike individuals, firms are unable to evade debt, due to
reasons such as immobility, reputation, etc. and therefore can
borrow at the lenders’ interest rate r
13. As we are dealing with a
small open economy, r is an exogenous variable in the model. This
means that firms take it as given and choose the level of capital
accordingly, that is to equalize the marginal revenue with the
marginal costs of capital:
(5)
where 
is capital per unit of efficiency (or similarly the factor intensity
of the economy). Since r is constant, k also will be constant.
I further assume that both the goods market and the labour
market are perfectly competitive. This implies that firms have a
profit equal to zero. Thus, the salary of a single individual i is
defined as: 







fk r '( ) =
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12 The results still hold under different types of credit market imperfections,
such as asymmetric information, as long as borrowing is costly. 
13 As argued by the authors in the original paper, this assumption does not
affect the results, but simply reflect that generally individuals are more credit
constrained than firms.where ws is a function of capital per unit of efficiency and as a
consequence is fixed
14. 
The salary is thus given by the product of a component
determined by the exogenous parameters of the models, that is
the technology and the interest rate, with the productivity of the
individual (or similarly his part of human capital). This means
that each individual will have a different wage according to his
investment in education. 
3. - Endogenous Investment in Human Capital
It is obvious that the log-linearity of the utility function
implies that each individual has the same propensity to consume
(and thus to leave bequest). In other words, it is independent from
the initial wealth and is equal to a fixed share of income. 
Let us now describe the individual optimal decisions with
respect to h. There are three possible states of the world for each
individual: he can decide not to invest in education and thus work
as unskilled for both periods; he can decide to invest in education
more than his initial wealth and thus be a borrower; he can decide
to invest less than his initial wealth and thus be a lender. 





where ε = αlogα+(1–α)log(1–α). The individual decision will rely
upon the comparison between these three utilities. 










Ux w r rx n () l o g ( ) ( ) =+ + +    + 21 ε
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14 For the formal derivation see APPENDIX 1.
unskilled
borrower




We  can immediately see that the borrower’s optimal invest-
ment in education is less than the lender’s optimal investment in
education. The reason is that the borrower has an additional cost
to have access to education given by the difference between the
borrowing and the lending interest rate. Therefore, the unique as-
sumption of credit market imperfections is sufficient to create a
first separation in the society, because the rich have an easier ac-
cess to education and as a consequence, are more likely to work
in the skilled sector. It is interesting to study if this separation
still holds in the long run; we will consider this in the fourth sec-
tion. For now let us concentrate on the short run equilibria. 
The individual faces the following strategic problem: given his
initial wealth x, he has to figure whether it is profitable to invest
in education, and if so, decide between operating as a borrower
or as a lender. 
Let us start by comparing (7) and  (9). The individual will
decide to invest in education only if:
(12)
The first thing worthy of note is that the condition stated by
(12) does not depend directly on wealth, but indirectly, in the sense
that it is only defined for x ≥ h. 
However given the exogenous parameters of the model, that
is the production function, the value of β, r and wn, it can happen
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15 For the formal derivation see APPENDIX 2.that equation (12) never holds. In that case no one invests in
education
16. Hence there is no physical capital K and an excess
supply of loans prevail. This drives the world interest rate down
until (12) is satisfied for some values of h.
The left hand side of equation (12) has a maximum at
Let us define h* as the amount of investment in education which
satisfies  (12) with equality. Given the argument above, in
equilibrium: h* ≤ hl
17.
Consider the most general case, that is when the constraint
is not binding. First, remember that (12) applies only for lenders,
in other words when x ≥ h. So we can infer that individuals whose
inherited wealth is at least as high as hl will decide to invest hl in
education rather than studying as unskilled for both periods.
Those who inherit between h* and  hl will invest in education
exactly equal to their initial wealth since the derivative of the
lender’s income is positive at h less than hl.
What happens when the initial wealth is less than h*? Those
people, since they can’t be lenders, must choose between being
borrower and being unskilled. At this point it becomes essential
to distinguish between these two cases: hb < h* or hb ≥ h*.
Let us start by considering the second case, which as we will
see, is more interesting. 
Individuals whose initial wealth is equal to x < h* ≤ hb, will
decide to work in the unskilled sector if and only if: 
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16 It is worthy of note that we are assuming: ws < wn (2+r). This assumption
although plausible, is crucial for the validity of the results. 
17 Given the concavity of the productivity function, it is clear that for a given
value of the LHS of (12) there will two values of h (one higher and one lower
than  hl) which satisfy the equation with equality. The lower value will never be
chosen in equilibrium since it is a dominated strategy: the same level of income
can be achieved by a smaller investment in education! Hence, in the analysis that
follows, we will not consider as solutions all the values h > hl.where the RHS of (13) is the income function of the borrower at
its maximum value. We can immediately notice that unlike
equation (12), equation (13) directly depends on the initial wealth.
To  be more precise, inequality (13) holds only if: 
(14)
Thus, individuals who inherit less than the threshold value f
prefer to work as unskilled.
Rearranging equation (14) we get:
(15)
where the last term in the RHS must be positive since the income
function for borrowers is defined only at x < hb. In other words,
if it profitable to borrow only when the initial wealth is higher
than  f, but this threshold value is higher than hb, no one will
borrow since the borrowing condition requires x < hb. This
corresponds to the first of the two cases mentioned above. Indeed
if hb < h*, we know from equation (12) that
is negative. As a result the borrowing state disappears. But as we
have already said, this drives r down which in turn drives h* down
until hb ≥ h*. The latter corresponds to the first case, where
is positive. Hence in equilibrium: f < hb
18. 
Summarizing the results above:
— if x < f, the individual will work as unskilled. 
— if f ≤ x < h*, the individual will borrow an amount equal
to hb – x.
() ( ) ( ) 11 2 +− + − +
−
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18 Let us assume for sake of simplicity that: f < h*. This assumption does not
change the fundamental results of the model but only the threshold values.— if hb ≤ x ≤ hl, the individual will invest in education exactly
equal to his initial wealth. 
— if x > hl, the individual will lend an amount equal to x – hl.
We  still need to analyse what happens when h* ≤ x < hb. In
this case the individual can choose between investing in education
exactly equal to his initial wealth and achieving an income equal
to (1 + x
β)ws, or borrowing an amount equal to hb – x to invest
hb in education and achieving an income equal to (1 + h
β
b)ws –
(hb – x)(1 + i). From what has been shown up until now, it is clear
that the more x approximates to h*, the more likely is the income
of the borrower to be larger than the income achieved by investing
exactly the initial wealth. Whereas the opposite is more likely to
be true the more x approximates to hb. Thus we can infer that
there is a value of x between h* and hb, that we will call h**, which
will make the individual indifferent between borrowing hb – x to
invest hb in education, and investing exactly x in education. The
exact value of h** depends obviously on the exogenous parameters
of the model. Hence at x = h**, the following condition holds:
(16)
Equation (16) simply states that for such an amount of initial
wealth, the costs of borrowing match exactly the additional
income achieved from investing more than x in education. As a
result, individuals who inherit h* ≤ x < h** will become borrowers,
whereas individuals who inherit h** ≤ x < hb will invest x in
education (being neither borrowers nor lenders). 
Hence, the optimal strategy that couples each value of x with
an amount h invested in education is the following: 
— if x < f, the optimal investment in education is equal to 0.
— if f ≤ x < h**, the optimal investment in education is equal
to hb.
— if h** ≤ x ≤ hl, the optimal investment in education is equal
to x.
— if x > hl, the optimal investment in education is equal to hl. 
The relationship between the initial wealth and the investment
in education is underlined in Graph 1:
() ( ) ( ) hx i hx w bb s −+ =− 1
ββ
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original model. Even abandoning the hypothesis of indivisibility
of the investment in education, the initial distribution of wealth
still determines how much individuals invest in education, as well
as their consumption and their bequest. As a consequence, it also
determines aggregate output. This result is due to the assumption
that borrowing capital is costly, since these costs are sufficient to
generate different levels of access to the credit market according
to the each one’s initial wealth.
However, this short run analysis loses relevance if the
distribution of wealth is ergodic, that is if every initial distribution
of wealth converges in the long run to the same distribution of
wealth. 
In their paper, Galor and Zeira show that the assumption of
Convergence, Inequality and Education, etc. L. CASSAR
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GRAPH 1
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INITIAL WEALTH 








0non convexities in technologies at the individual level (indivisibil-
ity of h) leads to multiple long run equilibria in the distribution
of wealth. 
We  will see in the next section that these results still hold
when h is divisible.
4. - Long Run Dynamics
As in the original model, the distribution of wealth not only
determines equilibrium in period t, but also determines next
period distribution of inheritances:
(17)
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sIt is clear from Graph 2 that there are three equilibria x –
n, g,
x –
s, of which only two x –
n and x –
s, are stable. Indeed the slopes of
the income functions are the same as in the original model, where
it was assumed that: 
(18)
(19)
Equation  (18) guarantees that the process of bequest from
generation to generation is stable and does not explode. On the
other hand, equation (19) suggests that the monitoring costs are
high enough to make unstable. 
Individuals who inherit less than f work as unskilled and so




Individuals who inherit more than f invest in education but
not all their descendants will remain in the skilled sector. The
critical point is: 
(21)
Individuals who inherit less than g, even if they invest hb in
education, after some generations their descendants will work as
unskilled and their wealth will converge to x –
n. 
Individuals who inherit more than g, invest in education and
so do their descendants. Their wealth converge to: 
(22)
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g is the population who inherit less than g. Therefore,
equation  (23) depends on the initial distribution of wealth. The
higher the number of individuals who inherit more than g, the
higher will be the number of descendants who will converge to
x –
s, the higher will be the long-run level of average wealth. The
same initial average of wealth concentrated on a little minority
will make the economy converge to x –
n.
5. - Implications 
These results have three different but related implications: 
— The club convergence hypothesis still hold under the
assumption of a much more continuous education function. In
other words, incomes per capita of two countries with similar
preferences and technologies converge towards one another
provided that their initial conditions are similar. In this model the
initial conditions refer to the initial distribution of wealth, thus
to the concept of equity. 
— Even under the assumption of a much more continuous
education function, inequality has a negative effect in the aggre-
gate level of income, in both the short and long run
19. 
— Even under the assumption of a much more continuous
education function, we can generate a non ergodic distribution of
wealth. In fact, this model suggests that inequalities tend to per-
sist over time. Countries with high initial inequalities, will main-
tain an unequal distribution of wealth. This result permits us to
give a new interpretation of the empirical data which show a neg-
ative relation between inequality and wealth, suggesting that dis-
tribution of income is more equal in rich countries than in de-
veloping countries. Contrary to the famous curve of Kuznets
(1955), which explains this correlation through the existence of
different stages on the development path of a country
20, this mod-
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19 For more information about the relation between inequality and growth see
GALOR O. - MOAV O. (2004). 
20 In other words, according to Kuznets, the differences between poor coun-
tries and rich countries are due to the fact that these countries belong to differ-el attributes this dissimilarity to the fact that countries can con-
verge to different long run equilibria. 
6. - Extensions and Discussion
Let us now focus on the theoretical implications emerging
from the conclusions drawn so far in this paper, and more
generally from the hypothesis of club convergence. 
First of all, the model explains the differences between
national income per capita through the initial conditions and
especially through the initial distribution of wealth. Indeed,
according to this model, the permanent crisis of developing
countries can be due to an unequal distribution of wealth which
does not allow the poorest people to sufficiently invest in
education. This has caused the country’s level of human capital
to decrease over time, eroding individuals’ wealth. This model can
also explain why international donations from developed countries
to developing countries did not achieve the expected results:
donations are potentially effective provided that they are equally
distributed among the population and that they are actually
invested in human capital rather than spent on consumption
21.
Thus, according to this model, poor countries are likely to remain
poor, whereas rich countries have in common a large initial
investment in human capital. 
Furthermore it is worthy of note that equation (23) decreases
as L
g
t/L, the fraction of population who does not invest enough in
human capital to improve their economic status, increases. This
suggests two things: first, that is not a large population per sé —
as frequently argued — which hinders growth, but rather the ratio
between the skilled population and the total population. It is clear
that, the amount of skilled individuals being equal, in a country
with a larger population — if we assume that investments in
Convergence, Inequality and Education, etc. L. CASSAR
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ent stages of development. This theory implies, thus, that in the last stage of de-
velopment/growth all countries will have a similar, more equal, distribution of in-
come (conditional convergence hypothesis). 
21 For more information about failures of international donations see EASTERLY
W.  (2001); (2006).human capital create positive externalities for the society — it will
be more difficult to create the externalities necessary to take the
economy out of the crisis. From this point of view, smaller
countries are more efficient thanks to easier coordination and to
a lesser dispersion of resources. Secondly, aggregate initial wealth
being equal; growth will be higher where income is more equally
distributed. Again, the negative relation between inequality and
growth is supported, at least in the field of human capital.
If we assume that investments in human capital create posi-
tive externalities for the society, the model is able to explain the
phenomenon of “brain drain”. Indeed, individuals who potential-
ly have the ability and the possibility to invest in education may
not be able to get their investment returns, if the society in which
they live has a low average level of human capital. This happens
because a country with a low percentage of skilled/ educated per-
sons is less likely to offer a high quality education and institution,
plus there could be less demand for skilled workers. It is clear
that in this case, individuals will find it more rewarding to move
to a rich country; where the level of human capital is high, and
where they will get a better education and later will receive a
salary more adequate to their high competences. This extension
is equivalent, for example, to the assumption in the model that
the maximum investment h that an individual can make in edu-
cation depends not only on his own initial wealth but also the
other’s initial wealth. Indeed, it is less likely to found a top level
university where there is a low demand for education. 
Furthermore, it is possible — if we still assume positive ex-
ternalities and interdependence of wealth — that from a collec-
tive point of view, it is more suitable if all individuals study, even
if it means eventually renouncing the maximization of their own
profit. This would allow an increase in the average level of hu-
man capital of the country and convergence to the rich equilib-
rium. Supposing that this could happen, because the individual
members of a society are rational, forward looking, and care
enough about future generations to renounce a part of their own
consumption in order to guarantee a better quality of life for their
offspring, the problem of the lack of coordination among indi-
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presume that individuals would agree to the making of such sac-
rifices, if indeed they had expectations — and here arises the im-
portant role of expectations — that other individuals would, in
turn, invest in education: because individual investment has an
insignificant impact on growth. What, however, are their expec-
tations based upon? Clearly, the answer is upon the country’s av-
erage level of wealth. Now, it is evident that in developing coun-
tries where most of the population is poor, individuals will cer-
tainly not expect a large aggregate investment in education, and
so will decide not to risk
22 investing in human capital. That is
how vicious circles are created. Poor countries have expectations
of remaining poor, and this puts an end to individuals having the
necessary incentives to invest/risk in their future. This circle could
be interrupted by coordination among individuals. Indeed, they
could commit
23 themselves to investing in human capital regard-
less of their initial wealth. Clearly such a coordination of the pop-
ulation is very difficult to realize, especially in developing coun-
tries where the population is large and the mass media has little
diffusion.
Finally, I would like to highlight how all the implications just
discussed only depend on two assumptions: a non convex tech-
nology, and credit market imperfections. Indeed if individuals
could borrow at rate r, every member of the society would be in-
vesting in education the same amount: hl
24. The distribution of
wealth would become ergodic and there would be no longer mul-
tiple long run equilibria. In other words, the extent to which the
initial distribution of wealth determines the long run equilibrium
depends on the degree of openness of the credit markets. A coun-
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22 Investing in human capital in spite of an initial wealth below the threshold
level is a risk since individuals exchange a secured part of their income of today
with a potential part of their income of tomorrow. 
23 The commitment must be binding since there is the so called problem of
“time inconsistency”: once each individual is certain that the population will invest
in education — and so that the average level of human capital will increase —
since the personal investment has a slight impact, each individual will be induced
to deviate from the commitment in order to maximize his income.
24 Indeed equation (12) would apply to all individuals, including borrowers.try which starts with large income inequalities but which guar-
antees equal opportunities to all individuals, will reduce these in-
equalities and converge to the rich equilibrium. On the other hand,
a country with small income inequalities but where the access to
the credit market is allowed to rich people only — for example
because loans require large monetary warrants — will increase
these inequalities over time and converge to a lower national in-
come per capita compared to its potential level. Hence this mod-
el underlines the essential role of the credit market in influencing
a country’s economy in the short as well as in the long run. It
therefore becomes natural to question the importance in this con-
text of the creation of microcredit
25. Although still far from guar-
anteeing equal opportunities, microcredit is contributing to a re-
duction in the gap of opportunities between the rich and the poor,
by giving the latter access to the credit market from which they
were left out.
All these arguments lead us to a conclusion which, in my
opinion, is very important: the market alone does not necessarily
create growth. The latter can require government interventions
aimed at promoting equal opportunities. Indeed, we must take
into account that, in the reality represented by this model, a
unique policy of equal redistribution of income is sufficient to
facilitate the access to education for all individuals. Similarly,
the government could either implement a policy aimed at
facilitating access to the credit market, or offer scholarships to
the poorest.
Finally, as already mentioned, these government interventions
— and international aid programmes — must not be restricted to
a simple allocation of funds but must also be accompanied by
measures of control aimed at guaranteeing that these funds are
actually invested in human capital. In other words, these policies
of intervention should create the right incentives
26 for individuals
to make choices which then promote growth.
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25 For more information about the microcredit see MUHAMMAD Y. (2001).
26 For more details about the theory that — “Individuals respond to incentives”
— see EASTERLY W.  (2001).7. - Conclusions 
In this paper, I have tried to extend the model of Galor and
Zeira to show how, even under the assumption of a much more
continuous education function, the initial distribution of income
continues to influence economic activity both in the short and in
the long run. This result enables us to extend the results of Galor
and Zeira (1993) to situations closer to reality; such as the
opportunity to decide how much to invest in education. Thus, the
hypothesis of club convergence still hold for every discretional
value of h, not only when it is a fixed value.
Escaping from these poverty traps is possible only through
government interventions. Since long run aggregate income will
be higher if it is more equally distributed initially, government
interventions through the policy of income redistribution, is not
only advantageous but sometimes even crucial.
The primary role played by initial conditions in determining
the long-term equilibrium must make us wonder how much
chance accounts for the fate of a country. If a natural disaster hits
a group of the population, inequalities will emerge, and if the
government does not respond promptly, these inequalities will last
over time reducing the long run income per capita.
This model, although it is consistent with the neoclassical par-
adigm, succeeds in reproducing economies which are intrinsical-
ly unstable.
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Given the complexity of the analysis, I will justify equation
(6) through a specific example. Let us consider the following
Cobb-Douglas production function for each firm j
27:
Profit maximisation implies:
where r is the remuneration of each unit of physical capital, and
ws is the remuneration of each unit of human capital.
Each firm in perfect competition pays each unit of input the
value of its marginal productivity.
In equilibrium, the total demand for Kj and Hj from the firms
will be equal to the total supply offered by:
where  j denotes each firm and i denotes each individual.
Similarly for human capital:
It can be inferred that the factorial intensity chosen by each
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27 For sake of simplicity I removed the temporal notation.Hence:
Firm’s income distribution is based on the quantity of input
owned by each individual. Human capital distribution among
individuals depends on individual investment in education and
will be remunerated accordingly. More specifically, if individual i
who invested hi, owns a part Hi = (1+h
β
i) of the aggregated human
capital
his remuneration will be proportional. Thus, the wage paid to each
individual  i is:  Hiws = (1+h
β
i)ws, which matches equation (6) in
my model. 
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— The maximisation problem of the borrower is given by:
We get:
The second derivative bears out that it is a maximum.
— The maximisation problem of the lender is given by:
Solving:
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